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ABSTRACT
This research examines the tactics and strategies used most
frequently by 138 Army negotiators randomly selected from
throughout the continental United States. Respondents selected
from 3 2 tactics those which they used most often, and those which
they felt industry used most often against them. Respondents
also rank ordered ten strategies according to the frequency in
which they were used, and the order in which they preferred their
use. The strategies were also examined for preference under five
different contract situations. The survey questionnaire method
was used to collect information of demographics, and negotiator's
use of tactics and strategies. Frequency distributions, Kendall
Tau b and the Spearman rank correlation tests were used to examine
tactics and strategies for preference of use and to test for
agreement. Analysis indicates that Army negotiators employ
tactics and strategies that rely on statistical analysis, and
negotiate in as professional and straightforward a manner as
possible. However, evidence indicated that an adversarial





As a result of recent world events, such as the fall of the
Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the
growing United States Federal deficit, the American people are
demanding a smaller defense budget. In spite of this demand for
less spending on the military, trouble spots still exist around the
world and the leaders of the American military continue to stress
the importance of a capable, flexible, potent military, able to
exert influence anywhere in the world. In order to reduce spending
on defense while maintaining the capability of United States Armed
Forces, the current U.S. strategy calls for a smaller continental
United States-based military trained to employ high technology
weapon systems and ready to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world to
accomplish a variety of missions. This strategy is not a matter of
doing the same with less, rather it expects the military of
tomorrow to do more with less. Accomplishing this ambitious goal
while undergoing a budget reduction demands a vision of the future,
a clear set of strategic objectives, a unified effort to achieve
those objectives, and greater efficiency.
As the Pentagon struggles to limit the erosive effects of
budget cuts on its capabilities, effectiveness in all phases of the
budgeting and outlay processes becomes increasingly important. One
area that may have the greatest long term budgetary affect is the
Government acquisition process. [Ref. 44 :p. 3] The costs
associated with acquisition represent outlays that may be reduced
without having a commensurate effect on readiness or capabilities
because the costs incurred in the acquisition process are
themselves directly correlated to the negotiating skills of the
contracting officer.
B. SPECIFIC PROBLEM
Due to the complexities and pressures involved in Government
contracting, specifically, complying with a myriad of regulations
and legislative guidelines, often with time constraints and
understaffed, Army Contracting Officers are not as effective as
they could be. Although formal training now exists for contracting
professionals who are involved in negotiating contracts, the amount
of formal training varies greatly throughout the community. Most
contract negotiators initially learn through on-the-job training.
This often means observing a more experienced negotiator and then,
through trial and error, learning what tactics and strategies work
and which do not. In the worst case, the inexperienced Government
negotiator may not even recognize the nature and extent of
strategies and tactics being used against him or her by a
contractor. In such a case, one would expect that the contract
would most likely favor the defense contractor. If contracting
professionals were better prepared, the Army would probably be
better represented in the contract negotiation process.
C. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The purpose of this research is to determine if U.S. Army
contracting officers and negotiators use similar negotiation
tactics and strategies and if so, which are used most frequently
and under what circumstances. In addition, this study seeks to
identify which negotiation tactics and strategies they perceive
their commercial counterparts most often use against them. Any
trends that indicate a superior set of strategies or tactics which
could result in a more efficient or effective contract will be
discussed.
The research questions in support of this objective were as
follows:
1. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION:
What negotiation strategies and tactics are most
frequently used by Army contract negotiators and what
tactics do they perceive their industry counterparts
most often use against them?
2. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
a) What does current literature and theory say about
negotiating tactics and strategies?
b) What is the profile of the Army negotiator?
c) Which tactics do Army negotiators use most frequently?
d) Which tactics do Army negotiators perceive their
commercial counterparts use most frequently?
e) Which strategies do Army negotiators use most
frequently?
f) What strategies are used under different contract
situations?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
This research is the third project of its type. The first
study entitled Identification of Negotiation Tactics and Strategies
of Air force Contract Negotiators , was conducted by Air Force
Captains Robert M. Catlin and Bernard J. Faenza in 1985. [Ref. 9]
A follow-up study entitled Examination of Negotiation Tactics and
Strategies of Air Force Logistics Command Contract Negotiators ,
was conducted by Air Force Captain Terry L. Peterson in 1986. [Ref.
36] Between the two studies, questionnaires from 370 Air Force
contract negotiators were examined to determine the use and
preference for ten negotiation strategies and the frequency of use
for thirty-two negotiation tactics. To date, no similar Army study
has been conducted. To enable a direct comparison with these
previous studies, the same questionnaire (with minor modifications)
was used for this research.
The population used for this survey was obtained from the Army
Contracting Organization and Management Data directory dated April
1992. Response to the questionnaires was limited by the fact that
it was a voluntary survey. No effort was made to limit or balance
the types of organizations surveyed. The primary objective was to
maximize the number of surveys sent to Army Contracting Officers
and specialists. Although the survey respondents remained
anonymous, a list of the organizations solicited to assist are
displayed in Appendix A. The assumption has been made in this
study that the responses to this survey are honest and truthful and
that they are representative of the Army contracting community.
Any conclusions drawn from the data received from this survey would
apply throughout the Army Acquisition Corps. In light of the above
assumption, it is important to consider that the answers to the
survey questions are Army contract negotiators' opinions of which
strategies or tactics they use or have used in different situations
and may not actually be representative of what they have done in
the past. Additionally, the Army contract negotiators' perceptions
of which strategies and tactics their industry counterparts use
against them, are opinions which may reflect existing bias or
prejudice.
E . METHODOLOGY
The data for this thesis consist of information gathered
through a questionnaire. This questionnaire was adapted from the
one used in the 1985 Catlin and Faenza study. The survey was sent
to Army Contracting offices throughout the country. A list of the
Army Contracting Offices was compiled with the assistance of the
Army Contracting Support Agency. No effort was made to organize or
limit the respondents of this survey. Therefore, the sample
received can be considered random to the extent that surveys were
sent to every type of unit listed in the Army Contracting
Organization and Management Data directory and surveys were
randomly returned. The survey consisted of two parts. Part one
gathered data on the profile of the respondent. Part two involved
three sections. Section one asked the respondent to indicate the
negotiating tactics he or she used most often from a list of 32
tactics. In addition, the respondent was asked to identify the
tactics perceived to be used most often by his/her contracting
counterpart in industry. Section two asked respondents to rank ten
strategies in the order of the frequency used, and section three
asked that the negotiators to indicate their most preferred
strategy under different circumstances, e.g. contract type, dollar
amount, type of acquisition, and degree of completion. The Kendall
Tua b and Spearman's tests were used to test for independence or
agreement between Government and civilian negotiators.
F. PRINCIPLE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Although the following terms have been defined differently by
numerous sources, a synthesis of these terms is outside the scope
of this research. Terms are adapted directly from the original Air
Force study by Catlin and Faenza in order to ensure that the
meanings of terms and concepts are similar. [Ref. 9] As a result,
respondents to this questionnaire answered questions within the
same context as both groups of previous respondents, and the data
from this survey are contrasted with the data collected twice
before.
Negotiations. Negotiating. Negotiate; These terms characterize the
discussions or bargaining between Government and industry in order
to reach agreement on type, number, and price of military items,
and the terms and conditions of the contract, including those
relating to legal rights and obligations, delivery, payment
disputes, remedies, and others prescribed by law and/or
specifically consented to by both parties. [Ref. 9; p. 6]
Strategy; This term means a specific plan designed to achieve some
overall objective. Strategic planning involves determining overall
objective (s) before the detailed methods to be employed (tactics)
are selected. A strategy may be an individual tactic or an
accumulation of tactics employed in negotiations. [Ref. 9: p. 7]
Tactic, Technique; A tactic is a particular action deliberately
committed or omitted to support a predetermined strategy. , For
example, conceding on minor issues is a tactic generally used to
stimulate concessions from the other negotiator, while deliberately
avoiding answering a question may be designed to stall the
negotiations or test the patience of the other side.
[Ref. 9: p. 7]
G. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I has introduced the importance of contract
negotiations as the military strives to maximize what it can buy
with its shrinking budget. Specifically, the important role that
contract negotiators play, and how any insight which might make
contract negotiators more efficient and effective can benefit the
military in a significant way. The research question and related
subsidiary questions were described. The scope, limitations, and
assumptions, followed by a discussion of the research methodology
concluded the chapter. Chapter II presents the theoretical
framework which is the foundation of this research and analysis.
Chapter III is a discussion of the research method. Chapter IV
presents the profile summary of the survey respondents and
analyzes the data collected on tactics. It identifies tactics used
by Army contracting officers and those tactics they believe their
counterparts in industry use against them. Chapter V analyzes the
frequency of use and preference for use of ten strategies under a
variety of conditions. Chapter VI presents conclusions,
recommendations, and areas which merit further research.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is designed to present the theoretical framework
within which the research was conducted and analyzed. Following a
brief reflection of the importance of negotiations in Government
procurement, "strategies and tactics" will be defined and a clear
understanding of the relationship between these two terms will be
made. Next will be a discussion of types of strategies, and the
strengths and weaknesses of each. Lastly, is an introduction to a
number of the more commonly used tactics.
In 1989, Federal buying accounted for 14.1 percent, or $184.2
billion of the Congressional budget of $ 1,309.9 billion. [Ref. 38:
p. 2] The purchasing agents and contracting officers who are
entrusted with the responsibility to spend the Department of
Defense's portion of these funds have an extremely important task.
"Nowhere else in the government acguisition process do the
abilities of a single individual have so direct an impact on the
money spent by the Department of Defense." [Ref. 38 :p. 3] The
responsible expenditure of funds allotted by Congress is not only
important simply for the economic purpose of getting the best value
for a fair and reasonable price, but also to avoid the negative
impact that cost overruns and exorbitant prices have on "the public
trust". Under the "free enterprise" system that exists in the
U.S., the forces of free and open competition would ideally produce
a fair and equitable price. However, a number of factors prevent
the Government from always using competition as a means of insuring
a fair and reasonable price. As a result, the Department of
Defense relies heavily on negotiations as a method of procurement.
In order to use public funds most efficiently, Government
contracting officers must be as experienced in contract negotiation
strategies and tactics as their counterparts in private industry.
B. STRATEGY AND TACTICS
The terms "strategy and tactic" were defined in Chapter one,
however, it is not uncommon to wonder what differentiates a
strategy from a tactic and how are they both selected for a
particular negotiation. Specifically, a strategy is a plan of
action used to achieve some goal, while a tactic is a technique or
maneuver used to carry out a strategy. In pursuing a certain
strategy, any number of tactics might be used. [Ref.
6 : Introduction] The National Contract Management Association
diagrams this relationship between strategies and tactics very
clearly in what they call the synergistic negotiations (SYNEG)
planning relationship. [Ref. 33 :p. VII-16] Figure I depicts the
Acquisition Strategy as the foundation for a particular acquisition
and sets the limits within which the contracting strategy is
developed. From this foundation flows the contracting strategy,
the negotiation strategy (which is the level that this research
will focus on) , and negotiation tactics. Figure I displays how
each plan, strategy, or tactic is dependent upon the decision made
at the level above, and an analysis of the factors at that level.
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Acquisition Strategy
(Functional Strategies and Plans)
Engineering—Logistical—>Contracting<—Test & Eval Other
(Contracting Strategy)
Competition Pricing Negotiation—Contract Type Other
(Negotiation Strategy)
Leverage Time Information Relations Other
(Negotiation Tactics)
Organization—Techniques Climate Modes Channels
Synergistic Negotiation Planning Relationships
FIGURE I SYNERGISTIC NEGOTIATION PLANNING RELATIONSHIPS
SOURCE: [REF. 33:P. VII-16]
C. FACTORS OF STRATEGY
An analysis of elements such as competition, pricing, contract
type and the extent of desired negotiations are the elements which
give way to a negotiation strategy. As depicted in Figure I, there
are four factors which must be considered when analyzing the
negotiation environment in order to understand what the limitations
are and therefore, how negotiations might be conducted: time,
information, relations and leverage.
For this research it is important to be familiar with the four
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key elements which must be studied prior to formulating a strategy.
An analysis of these factors; time, information, relation, and
leverage or power must be conducted to fully understand the
environment in which negotiations will be conducted. [Ref. 33 :p.
IX-16]
Time refers to how much of this very important asset is
available to each party and how it will act as a strength or
weakness for either party. Information refers to what is available
to both sides, the accuracy of the data, how additional information
can be gathered, and who, if anyone, might be in an advantageous
position. Relationship questions how long the buyer and seller
will be involved together in business and includes the possibility
of later renegotiations or a possible long term relationship. [Ref.
33: p. IX-16] Leverage or Power refers to the amount of sanction or
assets a party can wield and thereby influencing the actions of the
other. [Ref. 7:p. 46] In fact, Barlow and Eisen in "Purchasing
Negotiations" felt that power was the most important of these
factors and "will affect overall strategy and the type of tactics
employed." [Ref. 2:p. 143] Once the environment has been analyzed,
the negotiator or negotiating team must design or choose the
strategy.
An analysis of negotiation literature published over the past
thirty years was conducted in preparation for this research.
Although different authors categorized strategies in many different
ways and used different terms to describe similar concepts, only
two general categories of strategies emerged. These categories of
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strategies are "traditional" or "competitive" which involves
positional bargaining, and "collaborative" or "principled
negotiations" which involves interest bargaining. [Ref . 33: p. IX-19
& IX-21] In the traditional approach to negotiations, a price
position is developed for a certain requirement under procurement.
This price position usually consists of a maximum, minimum, and
target price. The range between the maximum and minimum provides
the negotiator bargaining room. Both the maximum and the minimum
positions are based on the highest and lowest probable costs as
best predicted through price analysis techniques. Negotiations
usually begin with the seller quoting their ceiling price and the
buyer their floor. The object of traditional negotiations is for
both sides to discuss individual areas of disagreement and attempt
to reach concessions in each area until agreement on the entire
contract can be reached. It is not unusual for this process to
take a great deal of time, money, and energy due to the numerous
tactics that can be used and encountered throughout this exchange.
Volumes have been written advising negotiators how to win at this
game of compromise. [Ref. 19: p. 6]
Traditional negotiations are the most common type of
strategies used in Government contracting. [Ref. 21 :p. 97] The
danger in using traditional strategies is that by maximizing one's
gain, one can also maximize their opponent's losses. [Ref. 31:p.
157] The greatest weakness with this strategy is that in order to
get what is considered to be a fair and equitable deal, one must be
prepared to use and counter any number of several hundred different
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tactics. [Ref. 20: p. 17] The result is the gamesmanship that
typically is a part of Government negotiations. It is not unusual
that by using this strategy a we-they or adversarial relationship
develops between the negotiators. [Ref. 20:p. 18] Too often, one
or both sides of a negotiation are willing to win at the expense of
their opponent. Sometimes competitive negotiators get carried away
in a power struggle with their opponents and find themselves in
awkward positions. Those positions include a fear of losing face,
feelings of personal pride from "beating' one's opponent, a lack of
understanding of both side's needs, or feeling outside pressures
such as a failing economy. The more attention paid to positions in
a negotiation, the less attention is given to the issues and
interests of each side. As a result, negotiators often conclude by
splitting the difference between the last opposing offers rather
than designing a solution that best meets the interests of both
sides. [Ref. 19:p. 5]
This delicate balance between a win-win and a win-lose
negotiation is often described by the experts as the Prisoners'
Dilemma [Ref. 6:p. 103] or Negotiator's Dilemma (see Figure II).
[Ref. 31:p. 157] In this model of negotiating behavior, two
player's are engaged in negotiations and know the benefits
resulting from the four possible outcomes. Although both players
would benefit by working together, either player would benefit more
if they used competitive gamesmanship while the other negotiated in
a collaborative manner. Because of both negotiators'












NOTE: Player A's payoff is at the lower left in each cell
Player B's payoff is at the upper right in each cell
FIGURE II THE NEGOTIATORS DILEMMA. SOURCE: [REF. 31: P. 157]
very important, it is not uncommon for one or both sides to use
this strategy. [Ref. 31:p. 157] It is more difficult to build
trust when multiple players are involved in negotiations,
subsequently negotiators are less likely to reach mutually
beneficial results. Research using this model shows that players
with frequent renegotiations learn to trust one another enough to
collaborate to the benefit of both sides. [Ref. 31:p. 160-161]
Research also supports the fact that if Player A can not determine
if Player B uses gamesmanship, and Player B benefits, then Player
B will usually not collaborate. In other words, negotiations
become mutually beneficial when the negotiators build a trust in
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relationships through frequent interaction. However, in spite of
how long a relationship may exist, if one player is getting away
with some benefit without the other player's knowledge, research
indicates that this deceptive activity will probably continue.
[Ref. 31:p. 162]
The result of such adversarial negotiations is often a loss of
trust and a reluctance to negotiate without adequate precautions in
the future. [Ref. 31:p. 34] Unfortunately, this is the state of
Government negotiations with Industry today.
Today, most of the dealings between businesses and government
in the United States are adversarial, as government probes,
inspects, taxes, influences, regulates, and punishes. ...
Business managers at all levels negotiate delays, develop
means for partial compliance, defend themselves in lawsuits,
and otherwise seek to minimize the impact of government on
their operations while responding to the many disparate
agencies with which business comes into contact. [Ref. 21:p.
97]
This dismal view of Government and Industry relations is not
surprising if one accepts the Negotiator's Dilemma model as a
realistic model of how most negotiations are conducted. The
following quote from a 1967 Harvard Business Review article about
negotiation gamesmanship supports just how accepted competitive
negotiations are.
Be as sweetly unreasonable as possible in a convincingly
logical fashion without permitting your opponent to decide
that it is impossible to deal with you. [Ref. 24 :p. 53]
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Although competitive negotiations are often criticized because
of the win-lose mentality that often results, the fact remains that
it is a much more common strategy than principled negotiations. A
few experts favor competitive negotiations for the following
reasons:
1. Conflict is inevitable and not necessarily harmful.
2. Some kinds of conflict can contribute immeasurably to
the health and well-being of the organization— for
example, by stimulating productive competition.
3. No matter what the conflict, it can be managed in such a
way that losses are minimized and gains maximized.
[Ref. 22:p. 24]
The most important reason that Government negotiates with a
competitive strategy is to preserve the public trust. Less than
arms-length relationships between Government and Industry lead the
public to believe that collusion is occurring. In spite of the
requirement to maintain a professional relationship between
Government and Industry, relationships need not be as adversarial
in nature as they have become in some cases. [Ref. 38: p. 84]
The second type of strategy is "principled negotiation" or
"collaborative" bargaining. The intent of this strategy is to
reach a satisfactory agreement between negotiating parties more
efficiently and amicably than one would normally expect through
competitive negotiations. [Ref. 45:p. 133] The objective to
principled negotiation is to focus on the true interests and wants
of each party, and through straight forward communication, attempt
to achieve common ground. In 1968 Gerard I. Nierenberg began a
prolific writing career by publishing "The Art of Negotiating", in
which he discussed Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs as they apply to
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negotiations. Nierenberg felt that there were often other
objectives or interests that motivated people besides money, and if
both negotiating parties' interests could be identified and
satisfied, then both parties would benefit. [Ref. 34 :p. 75] Since
Nierenburg's work in the late 1970' s, several authors have
expounded the merits of collaborative bargaining. Two of the most
notable have been members of the Harvard Negotiation Project
specifically Roger Fisher and William Ury. [Ref. 19] In their
book, "Getting to Yes", Fisher and Ury explain principled
negotiations as changing the game and viewing negotiations in a
more accommodating fashion. Fisher and Ury break this method down
into four basic points; people, interests, options, and criteria.
Fisher and Ury felt that too often in negotiations people
became emotionally entangled in their positions on an issue. As
discussed earlier, when ego's become involved, negotiations can
degrade to a battle of wills rather than issues. Therefore, in
principled negotiations, both sides should try to see themselves as
working together to achieve a common goal and try to "separate the
people from the problem." [Ref. 19 :p. 11]
Fisher and Ury's second point, interest, is similar to what
Nierenburg espoused. That often there are underlying needs and to
negotiate from positions, rather than recognizing and focusing on
those needs which cause negotiations to be less efficient. Thus
their second point is "focus on interests, not positions." [Ref.
19:p. 11]
The third point is to brainstorm as many options as possible.
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Since both sides should be speaking candidly and working toward a
common goal, possible solutions should be discussed and arrived at
together. From this idea comes the concept, "invent options for
mutual gain." [Ref. 19:p. 12]
The fourth point, "criteria", is used when sincere
disagreement exists between two parties. Often, as in competitive
bargaining, the more stubborn or patient party achieves the
advantage from their opponent. However, often ill will is the
result of this kind of confrontation. By "criteria", Fisher and
Ury are referring to some kind of mutually agreed upon criteria
that both sides will abide by. A fair standard might be a judge's
ruling, market value, or an expert's opinion. Hence the last
point, "insist on using objective criteria." [Ref. I9:p. 12]
As noted earlier during the discussion of the Negotiator's
Dilemma Model, if both players have trust in one another, there is
a basis for cooperation and mutual benefit. One way for principled
negotiations to occur is for it to evolve over time as both parties
learn to respect and understand each other. Principled negotiation
is the type of strategy used frequently in Europe and Japan between
Government and Industry. [Ref. 31: p. 160]
partnerships often include, besides business and
government, representatives of labor and special interest
groups who work to resolve problems and to build a consensus
on industry rules and standards in such areas as health,
safety, and environmental protection. [Ref. 21:p. 99]
The greatest strength of principled negotiations is that since the
negotiations are conducted without the time consuming gamesmanship
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of competitive negotiations, satisfactory concurrence is usually
reached faster, with more benefit to both parties, and better
relationships which are often critical during follow-on
negotiations.
Principled negotiation becomes a weakness when one side takes
it to an extreme and begins to assume that what benefits his
opponent benefits himself, but in fact it does not. [Ref . 20: p. 19]
However, the greatest weakness of principled negotiation is
described by the Negotiator's Dilemma. When a player is
negotiating in good faith in a collaborative fashion, that player
is left exposed to the tactics of a competitive negotiator. If one
reveals too much information to a competitive counterpart, that
information can be very detrimental. Research has shown that when
a player is attempting to establish a collaborative and trusting
environment, he has a surprising tendency to overlook a
noncooperative attitude in his counterpart and is particularly
vulnerable to being taken advantage of. [Ref. 31: p. 155]
D. FACTORS OF TACTICS
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a tactic is a technique
or maneuver which, either used alone or in concert with other
tactics, is used to carry out a strategy. As Figure I depicted,
tactics should be a logical consequence of a well-prepared
negotiation strategy and an analysis of those factors which effect
the conduct of the negotiations. This relationship between tactics
and strategy is very important, because it may not matter how
20
skillfully one executes tactics during negotiations, if the
strategy selected is poor or based on incorrect assumptions, the
negotiations could be disastrous. [Ref. 27:p. X-3] Tactics like
strategies are based on direction provided by strategic goals and
analysis of factors which help identify the environment of
negotiations. The four areas that the National Contract Management
Association has identified as critical for a complete understanding
of the negotiations environment and the limits to each side are;
organization, climate, modes, channels and techniques. [Ref. 33 :p.
VII-16]
Organization refers to the structure of the negotiations.
Issues such as whether negotiations occur by telephone or in
person, and use of a team approach and its authoritative structure
are addressed. Also the kinds of skills or knowledge required, and
the mixture of personalities most appropriate are examined. [Ref.
33
:
p. X-5 to X-7]
Climate refers to how well or poorly the negotiating parties
relate to each other. Although establishing a certain type of
climate is in itself a tactic, climate is considered a critical
area in understanding the negotiations environment because its
importance is often overlooked. If the proper climate can be set,
the direction of negotiations can be influenced. Negotiation
climates can be generally categorized as positive or negative in
nature. Depending on the type of climate desired, one must
consider the effect each tactic will have on the negotiating
atmosphere before implementation. The following list of opposing
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postures or actions demonstrate how some positions might encourage
a collaborative environment, while the other position might promote


















Modes and channels refer to the methods by which we transfer
and receive information. The three sources or modes of perceiving
information are visual, auditory, or through the sense of feelings
or emotions. Negotiators that understand that some people are
oriented in one mode more than another, and are able to recognize
these modes in their counterparts might be more effective
communicators. Channels are similar to modes in that the three
channels of communication are visual, verbal, and supporting or
body language. To be a more effectual negotiator, it is critical
to actively listen and be able to communicate efficiently on all
three channels. [Ref. 33:p. X-23 & X-24]
The fourth area critical to understanding the negotiating
environment, according to the SYNEG model represented in Figure I,
are techniques . Techniques or tactics have been defined earlier as
the tools used to carry out a negotiation strategy. One of the
first American negotiation scholars to publish extensively on this
subject was Dr. Chester L. Karrass. In 1968, Dr. Karrass published
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a collection of 200 negotiation strategies and tactics in his book,
" Give and Take: The Complete Guide to Negotiating Strategies and
Tactics". [Ref. 28] Since that time, many books have been
published listing hundreds of different tactics. However, except
for changing some of the names, the definitions have remained
basically the same. For this reason and also to allow comparison
with the previous Air Force studies that used Dr. Karrass*
s
terminology for tactics and strategies, his definitions were also
used for this research. Different authors have organized their
presentations of this subject in many different manners. Dr.
Karrass listed his tactics alphabetically. [Ref. 28 :p.
Introduction] His son Gary Karrass organized his book on tactics
in three general categories; offensive, defensive, and
collaborative. [Ref. 30:p. 8-9] Richard H. Buskirk used the
following categories in his book "Handbook of Managerial Tactics":
operating tactics, personal relationships or political tactics,
tactics critical on timing, and persuasive tactics. [Ref. 8:p. V-X]
The National Contract Management Association uses six categories to
organize negotiation tactics. These categories are worth listing
because they are logical groupings that are easy to recall and
should facilitate recognizing and countering tactics during
negotiations (see Table I)
.
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TABLE I SIX CATOGORIES OF NEGOTIATION TACTICS.
























This chapter examined the theoretical framework from which a
study of those tactics and strategies used by Army Contracting
Officers will be discussed. The two general categories of
strategies, "competitive" and "principled" were defined and
examined in terms of how they relate to the acquisition strategy
and the other pertinent factors that influence the selection of a
strategy. Additionally, tactics were discussed in terms of what
factors are critical in order to select the most appropriate in a
certain situation. Unlike strategies which are generally organized
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into two categories, some of the methods for categorizing the
multitude of tactics were also considered. An understanding of the
factors or areas critical when deciding on a tactic or strategy is
imperative for this research project in order to recognize trends




A. POPULATION AND DATA COLLECTION PLAN
The population used for this survey consists of Contracting
Officers and Specialists, both military and civilian assigned
within the continental United States (CONUS) , who are members of
the Army Acquisition Corps. The Army Acquisition Corps is the
Army's program, formed in response to the Defense Management Review
of July 1989. [Ref. 15:p. 2] The intent of the Army Acquisition
Corps is to improve the Army's Acquisition process and reduce
fraud, waste, and abuse throughout the process. The key purposes
of the Army Acquisition Corps are to select qualified personnel to
satisfy current critical acquisition positions, and to provide
special training, education, and experience to develop those
individuals to perform successfully in positions of greater
responsibility. [Ref. 15:p. 1] Approximately 4,250 military and
civilian personnel are assigned to the Corps. The majority of
these are assigned in CONUS. [Ref. 15:p. 1] From this pool, 475
surveys were sent out to 38 different contracting offices. The
sample organizations were obtained from the Army Contracting
Organization and Management Data directory dated April 1992. [Ref.
l:p. 1] A list of the organizations solicited to assist are
displayed in Appendix A. The collection technique used was to
telephonically contact contracting organizations from the Army
Contracting Organization and Management Data directory and
establish a point of contact. The appropriate number of
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questionnaires were sent to the points of contact with a personally
addressed cover letter to refresh the addressees of the content of
the survey, and to reinforce the importance of their participation
to this research. The points of contact then distributed the
surveys to their contracting personnel who had been previously
identified as having contracting experience. Each survey included
a postage-paid, pre-addressed envelope to facilitate its return.
Response to the questionnaires was limited by the fact that it
was a voluntary survey. A major weakness of the mail survey
approach is that any conclusions resulting from the data collected
are possibly skewed due to the decision of most people surveyed to
volunteer not to respond. No effort was made to limit or balance
the types of organizations surveyed. The primary objective was to
maximize the number of surveys sent to Army Contracting Officers
and Specialists.
B. SURVEY INSTRUMENT
The questionnaire used for this study was the same as the
questionnaire used in the two previous Air Force studies, with
slight modifications in order to gather more detailed information.
The areas of modification in this study were primarily in Part 1
which involved demographic information. The questionnaire is
included in this study as Appendix B. Due to the uniform nature of
the questionnaires of all three of these studies, results from
these different studies are subject to comparison without
compatibility problems. The original survey underwent a validation
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and refinement process through testing with faculty and staff of
the Air Force Institute of Technology. [Ref. 9:p. 19] Three
hundred and one individuals responded to this survey during the
first two studies. The questionnaire is composed of two parts.
Part I requests information that constitutes the demographic
portion of the data base. Part II asks specific questions
concerning the respondent's experiences regarding negotiation
tactics and strategies. The questionnaire requires approximately
3 minutes to complete.
The general information requested in Part I consisted of the
following information from the respondents: age; sex; military rank
or grade; total number of years of Federal service; total number of
years in the contracting field; the highest level of formal
education; the amount of professional contracting courses
completed; the frequency that the respondent negotiated contracts;
their current position and responsibilities; type of organization;
estimated number of contracts they participated as lead or other
than lead; and whether they are Certified Professional Contract
Manager (CPCM) certified. This information was consolidated into
a database and used to determine certain frequencies and whether
certain correlations existed between tactics used by Army
negotiators and industry, and the strategies preferred or used.
Part II, section one of the survey asked the respondents to
rank the top five negotiation tactics that they used most often.
The survey also asked that the respondents rank those tactics that
they felt their industry counterparts used most often against them.
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Once again, to allow comparison with the two previous Air Force
studies, the tactics selected for this survey were the same 32
tactics selected by Catlin and Faenza in the original study.
Respondents were encouraged to list other tactics that they or
their counterparts used. Although a few respondents wrote in
tactics that they felt involved less gamesmanship and suggested the
principled negotiations style, the overwhelming majority of
respondents selected only from the 32 tactics listed in the
questionnaire. The lack of less confrontational tactics among the
3 2 tactics listed may provide data that could lead to inaccurate
conclusions. Specifically, that negotiators use tactics that are
more confrontational than they actually use or would choose if
provided with a different list of tactics.
Part II, section two asked the respondent to choose and rank
order from a list of the ten strategies, those most frequently used
and then to rank order the same strategies in the order that they
would prefer to use them. As in section one, the respondents are
not limited to only the strategies that are listed in the
questionnaire, but are encouraged to include any of their choice.
Part II, section three utilized the same list of strategies as
section two, to include any that the respondents may have added.
This section asks the respondents to indicate the strategy that
they prefer to use under different contract situations. The
categories of contract situations are contract type, dollar amount,
type of contractual action, type of acquisition, and degree of
competition.
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The information from this survey provides a list of the most
frequently used tactics and strategies, and the strategy preference
of Army contracting officers under a variety of contracting
situations. An examination of these data should provide an insight
into the Army contracting community.
C. STATISTICS
The two prior Air Force studies used the Statistical Package
for Social Sciences (SPSS) for analysis of the data they collected.
However, for this study's database, two computer software packages
were used, Quattro Pro and SAS. Quattro Pro is a spreadsheet and
database program which provides a comprehensive mathematical and
statistical ability, as well as an integrated graphics capability.
[Ref. 4:p. 3] Quattro Pro was used primarily to compile the
demographic information. SAS is an integrated software system
that, among other facilities, is an extremely complete statistical
tool. [Ref. 39:p. 3] SAS was used in this study to conduct all
computations on the data of Part II. It was particularly useful in
determining whether correlation existed between two sets of data.
This was required for all hypothesis testing and was a significant
factor in the data analysis. In order to address the primary
research question, statistics testing was executed on the database.
Specifically, the frequency of preference or use, and ranking was
determined for several different categories. Testing for level of
agreement or consensus was conducted using two non-parametric
tests, Kendall's Taub and Spearman rank coefficient test.
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Kendall's Taub (also called the Kendall rank correlation
coefficient) determines the amount of relative agreement or
concordance between two variables. In this test, the data of one
variable are ranked from smallest to largest, then the data of the
second variable are ranked using the same order as the first
variable. Significant is the rank of the data value being
compared, not the value of the data themselves. The amount of
agreement between the ranking of two variables is then compared and
is expressed on a scale between -1 (perfect disagreement) and 1
(perfect agreement). [Ref. 39:p. R-9] Within this range, a
ranking of would indicate that absolutely no agreement exists
between the rankings of the two variables.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is similar to the
Kendall test in that it compares the relative ranking of the data
and not the values. However, the Spearman test rank orders the
data of both variables and then compares the two columns of data.
The amount of agreement between the pairs of data rankings is
computed and is expressed on the same scale between -1 and 1. [Ref.
39: p. R-9] Two assumptions that are required to use the Kendall
Tau b or Spearman tests are as follows:
1. The data consist of 'm' complete sets of data or
observations or measurements on 'n' objects or individuals.
2. The measurement scale is at least ordinal.
3. The observations as collected or recorded may consist of
ranks... or be capable of being converted to ranks. [Ref.
14:p. 327]
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Before a conclusion of relative agreement can be drawn from
either of these two statistical tests, the results of either test
must be significantly relevant. For this research, a 5%
significance level was used. While a 1% significance level would
indicate that the test is more likely to be accurate, using that
high a level of accuracy would possibly eliminate a correlation
that might be recognized using a 5% significance level, and could
be valuable for analysis. [Ref. 23 :p. 435] The null hypothesis (HJ
for the Kendall Taub test is defined as the two ranks of variables
having association. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the
alternative hypothesis (H
a ) is accepted, which indicates that some
level of agreement (or disagreement) exists. The null hypothesis
H„ is rejected (thus H
a
is accepted) when the significance level of
a given test is outside the 5% level identified as the standard.
If the significance of a test fails to be accurate within 5%, than
the null hypothesis is accepted and no determination of correlation
or agreement between the two values can be made. Another way of
stating this is that if H is not rejected, the conclusion is that
the data do not provide sufficient evidence to support the
alternate hypothesis. [Ref. 23 :p. 431] For example, if a Kendall
Tau b test results in a number close to 1, suggesting that a high
level of agreement exists, but the significance level of the test
is outside the 5% level of acceptance, then the null hypothesis is
accepted and no determination of agreement would be made.
The Spearman test uses the same hypothesis test as the Kendall
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Tau b test. For this research, the Kendall Taub test will be the
primary indicator of correlation. If the significance level is
close to the 5% standard, then the Spearman test of rank
correlation coefficient will be used to confirm the judgment of the
Kendall Taub test.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter examined the population which was surveyed and
the method in which the survey respondents were selected.
Additionally, the questionnaire, the instrument on which this
research was based was discussed in detail. Specifically, the
organization of the survey into two parts; demographic information,
and questions regarding preference and frequency of different
tactics and strategies. The two non-parametric tests, Kendall Tau b
and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient tests, which were
used to calculate the amount of agreement or correlation between
two sets of ordered values were discussed. The survey collection
technique, the questionnaire, and the methods of analyzing the data
are fundamental components which are critical to this research. If
any of these three components are incorrect for this study or
incorrectly applied, then any resulting conclusions may be flawed
and cannot be trusted. It is with this understanding of how the
data was collected and calculated, that the results in the
following chapter will be analyzed.
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IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION TACTICS
A. INTRODUCTION
The following discussion of the survey findings and the
analysis of those findings will address the following subsidiary
research questions 2b, 2c, and 2d. Respectively, those questions
are as follows:
What is the profile of the Army negotiator?
Which tactics do Army negotiators use most frequently?
Which tactics do Army negotiators perceive their commercial
counterparts use most frequently?
Specifically, data from Part I of the questionnaire will be
analyzed to determine the profile of the Army negotiator. This
information will be discussed in the order in which is was
collected on the questionnaire.
B. DEMOGRAPHICS OF SAMPLE POPULATION
Respondent population . To construct the database for this
survey, 475 individual surveys were sent out to 38 different Army
Contracting activities and offices that agreed to participate in
this study. (Appendix A) Surveys were returned by 13 8 respondents
which is a response rate of 29.05%.
A frequency distribution of the ages of the sample population
are displayed in Figure III. From the total sample population of
Army negotiators that responded to the survey, 68% are between the
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Figure III FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY AGE
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Figure IV depicts the distribution of respondents by sex. The
ratio of males to females is almost evenly distributed.
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FIGURE IV SURVEY POPULATION REPRESENTED ACCORDING TO SEX
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Figure V indicates the frequency distribution of the survey
population by their respective military rank or civilian grade.
The ranks and grades depicted constitute all of the respondents.
The civilian grade, GS-10 is not listed because no one of that
grade responded to the survey. This graph would indicate that
relatively few personnel at a junior level (GS-9) are conducting
negotiations. With the exception of five GS-9 respondents of the
13 8 in the survey pool, and a few military and senior grade
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FIGURE V SAMPLE POPULATION DEPICTED BY RANK AND GRADE.
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
civilians, Figure V would indicate that civilians in the grades
of GS-ll and GS-12 constitute the bulk of the Army agency's
contract negotiators.
Years of Federal service is depicted in Figure VI. Over 71%
of the respondents had over 11 years of Federal service. This
would indicate that most respondents work for the Federal
Government as careerists rather than as temporary workers or as
11 job hoppers" who gather job skills and then leave the Federal
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FIGURE VI SURVEY POPULATION DEPICTED BY YEARS OF FEDERAL
SERVICE. SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
service.
Figure VII depicts the distribution of the survey population
in respect to the number of years of spent in the contracting
field. Analysis of Figure VII reveals that almost 50% of Army
contracting officers and specialists have more than 10 years in the
contracting field. A comparison between Figures VI and VII would
indicate once an individual enters the contracting profession, the
trend is for him or her to remain in the field.
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FIGURE VII SAMPLE POPULATION DEPICTED BY YEARS OF CONTRACTING
EXPERIENCE. SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
The smaller percentage of individuals with over 20 years of
contracting time compared to the greater number with Federal
service time could indicate that some people do transfer into the
contracting field after investing time elsewhere. Information from
Figure V (Rank/Grade Distribution) would indicate that 50% of the
people that transfer into the contracting field are military











FIGURE VIII SURVEY POPULATION DEPICTED BY EDUCATION LEVEL
Figure VIII depicts the education level of the sample
population. This graph displays a very high mean education
level, with over 75% of respondents having at least a bachelor's
degree.
Figure IX shows how many respondents had received formal
schooling in contracting. In order to determine in which of the
four educational categories to place each respondent, their
responses were sorted as follows: those with no contracting courses

























FIGURE IX SURVEY POPULATION DEPICTED BY AMOUNT OF FORMAL
EDUCATION IN THE CONTRACTING FIELD.
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
one or two of the following six courses - Basic Contract Pricing,
Intermediate-level Contract Pricing, Cost and Price Analysis,
Overhead Management, Contract Law, and Negotiations, were
considered to have "SOME BASIC ED". Those who had completed three
or more of these courses were considered to have "BASIC &
INTERMEDIATE ED"; finally those who had completed one or more of
the following advanced courses: Contract Pricing; Contract
41
Administration; Contract Management; and Contract Executive
Training were considered to have "ADVANCED ED". The survey shows
that over 60% of the respondents have had at least one advanced
contracting course, indicative of a high level of formal training
among respondents.






ALWAYS OFTEN OCCASIONALLY SELDOM NEW*
FIGURE X SURVEY POPULATION DEPICTED BY FREQUENCY WITH WHICH
THEY NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS.
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
Figure X shows the frequency with which the respondents felt
they negotiated contracts. This survey was targeted at the
individuals in each Army contracting agency or office who were
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qualified to negotiate contracts. As would be expected, most of
the respondents felt that negotiating contracts was a major portion
of their job.
Figure XI shows the duty positions of the respondents. Besides
showing distribution of the survey respondents, this graph
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FIGURE XI SAMPLE POPULATION DEPICTED BY DUTY POSITION,
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
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Figure XII shows the distribution of those surveyed by what
they considered their primary duty responsibility. This
information is closely correlated with that of the two previous
graphs and provides an indication as to who makes up the survey








POO AGO NEGOTIATOR REVIEWER ANALYST
FIGURE XII SAMPLE POPULATION DEPICTED BY DUTY RESPONSIBILITY
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
The demographic information presented in Figure XIII is
important when discussing the tactics and strategies in the
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following section. Any conclusions that might be made would be
irrelevant if a majority of the respondents were from organizations
different from the majority of the Army contracting community.
According to this graph, the respondents come from multiple
organizations in a distribution that seems representative of the
entire community. This supports the assumption that the survey
population is representative of the Army contracting community as
a whole.








FIGURE XIII SAMPLE POPULATION DEPICTED BY TYPE OP CONTRACTING
ORGANIZATION. SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
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Figure XIV shows the number of contract negotiations that the
average respondent had attended. The average number of
negotiations experienced as lead is 95.5. The average number the
same respondent had experienced as other than lead is 60.8. This
indicates that one of two situations exists: (1) a long train-up
period exists before one becomes a lead negotiator, or (2)
negotiators often back-up each other. An observation made when
entering the individual surveys into the database, was that most
often negotiators with little time as negotiators had very few
other than lead experiences. This would indicate that negotiators
are lead versus back-up at about a 3 to 2 ratio.
Figure XV shows the number of CPCM (Certified Professional
Contracts Manager) Certified personnel among the respondents. The
two CPCM respondents were military (only 5 of the 138 respondents
were military) . Apparently the initiative to attain this
certification is greater for military personnel.
Summary of Demographic Analysis . From this discussion of the
various demographic variables, an average survey respondent can be
described. The average Army contracting officer or specialist is
33 years of age, a GS-12, has 17 years of Federal service, 15 years
of contracting experience, has a bachelors degree, has had at least
one formal advanced level contracting class, and negotiates on a
frequent basis.
This description of the average respondent is useful in order
to put the following discussion of tactics and strategies into















AVERAGE NUMBER OFNEGOTIATION ATTENDED
FIGURE XIV SAMPLE POPULATION DEPICTED BY NUMBER OF NEGOTIATION
EXPERIENCES ATTENDED AS "LEAD" AND "NOT AS LEAD".
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
obvious anomalies support a conclusion that the respondents are
representative of the larger Army contracting community and that
the conclusions that can be drawn from the responses apply to the
larger community.
C. FREQUENCY AND RANKING OF THE TACTICS
Chapter II discussed the differences between different




















the concepts of competitive versus collaborative negotiation
strategies was discussed. Government regulations and legislation
requires Government contracting officers and agents to be fair and
reasonable, and a review of the literature in Chapter II found both
Government and Industry suggesting a less confrontational
relationship would be better for all parties. By definition,
tactics are means of accomplishing a chosen strategy. Therefore,
by analyzing the tactics used most often by Army negotiators and
those tactics they feel are being used against them by their
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industry counterparts, insight into the perceived relationship may
be possible. The insight into this relationship is addressed in
subsidiary research questions 2c and 2d.
The frequency which the respondents felt that they used 3 2
different tactics was calculated, and those tactics were rank-
ordered from most used to least used. The respondents were also
asked to indicate which of those same 32 tactics were used against
them by their industry counterparts and with what frequency. Those
statistics were also rank ordered from most used to least used.
The results of both of these questions are displayed in Table 2.
As discussed in Chapter III, one possible deficiency with the
questionnaire was the lack of less confrontational or negative
tactics among those listed. The argument is that if more tactics
with qualities such as "honesty", "integrity", and "trust" were
listed, then the results in Table 2 might be very different.
The Kendall Taub (t) and Spearman (SR) rank coefficient tests
were used to test for agreement between the tactics the Army
negotiators used versus the tactics they felt their counterparts
used against them. The format used in this study for reporting the
test for concurrence using these two tests is as follows:
a. Hypothesis:
Description of the null hypothesis (H ) and the alternate
hypothesis (H
a ) .
b. Critical Value (CV) of the test: This value is dependent
on the number (n) of values in the two columns of ordered rankings
being compared for agreement.
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TABLE 2 FREQUENCIES AND RANK ORDER OF TACTICS.
SOURCE: DEVELOPED 8Y RESEARCHER
FREOUENCY AND RANKINGS OF TACTICS
RANKINGSFREQUENCIES AS %







251. Adjust the thermostat
2. Allow face-saving exits 6.5 0.3 5 26
3 . Appeal to patriotism 3.2 0.6 14 22
4. Ask for lots of data 10.7 0.3 1 27
5. Belabor "Fair & Reasonable" 8.6 2.1 3 17
6. "Bogey" - Budget Limits 3.7 0.6 13 23
7. Call frequent caucuses 4.5 3.2 9 12
8. Change negotiators 0.2 1.8 27 19
9. "Cherry-pick" the best deals 0.6 0.9 23 24
10. Deadlock the negotiations 1.3 5.6 19 6
11. Deliberate errors left in
offers
0.5 4.5 25 9
12. Deliberately expose notes or
wrong papers
0.8 0.2 22 29
13. Embarrass your opponent 0.3 31 28
14. Escalate to opponent's boss 5.9 3.0 7 13
15. Escalate to your boss 4.5 3.5 10 11
16. "Good-guy-bad-guy" roles 6.1 2.4 6 14
17. "High-Ball" offers 0.3 10.5 26 2
18. Impose "No-smoking rule" 0.2 28
19. "Low-Ball" offers 5.6 0.8 8 21
20. Make an offer they must refuse 1.6 2.2 18 15
21. Massage opponent's ego 3.0 2.2 15 16
22. "Must be on contract by 1 " 6.7 2.1 4 18
23. "My plane leaves at o'clock!" 4.1 32 10
24. Negotiate with limited authority. 4.3 9.2 11 3
25. "Off-the-record" discussion 3.8 5.1 12 7
26. Personal attack 0.2 1.6 29 20
27. Play hard to get 1.1 6.4 21 5
28. Refer to the firm's past poor
performance
1.8 0.2 17 30
29. Reverse auctioning 0.2 0.2 30 31
30. "Split-the-difference" offers 9.6 11.9 2 1
31. "Take-it-or-leave-it"offers 3.0 9.2 16 4
32. Threaten to walk out 1.3 4.9 20 8
(KTR = CONTRACTOR)
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c. Decision rule: Reject H if (t) or (SR) > some value X.
Some value X is defined by the number (n) of values at a 5%
significance level as stated in Chapter III.
d. Results: If Kendall Taub is close to the 5% significance
point, then the Spearman rank coefficient test will be used to
provide more information.
e. Decision: The test either rejects the H , in which case Ha
is accepted, or the data are insufficient to reject H .
f. Interpretation: Analysis of the decision and a discussion
of anything significant from that analysis.
1. Agreement Test between Army Negotiator and Contractor Tactics.
a. Hypothesis:
(H ) : The rank order of Army negotiating tactics is
independent of the rank order of industry tactics.
(H
a ) : The two sets of orders are not independent, i.e. there
is agreement.
b. Critical Value (CV) : Kendall CV = 0.352
Spearman CV = 0..352
c. Decision rule: Reject H if t > .352 or SR >.352
d. Results: T = .098 SR = .175
e. Decision: There is not sufficient evidence with which to
reject (H ) .
f. Interpretation: There is no correlation or agreement
between the tactics the Army uses and what they perceive their
counterparts use. At a minimum they use tactics in a statistically
51
different manner. Using data presented in Table 2 it is not
possible to determine statistically whether a confrontational
relationship exists. If the tactics could be rated accurately on
a scale between "most cooperative" to "most adversarial", then a
test for correlation might show statistical disagreement.
However, the fact that there is no significant statistical
correlation between the two lists of strategies is meaningful. This
may be interpreted that the Army negotiator feels that he and his
counterpart from industry come to negotiate with a different set of
tactics. A subjective analysis of each of the two lists of tactics
can provide insight into how the Army negotiator perceives he
should conduct his business, and also what approach he feels
industry uses most. The issue of whether or not a confrontational
relationship exists can be addressed by comparing the two lists of
tactics and making a subjective determination based on the "flavor"
or tone of the tactics being used. Table 3 provides a list of the
top 10 tactics used by each party. "Split-the-dif ference" is the
only tactic on both lists, and it is either the first or second
choice in each list. "Split-the-difference" is a tactics that can
be interpreted as one in which both parties come prepared to make
a quick settlement by splitting the difference between two offers
early in the negotiations. The use of "split-the-difference" does
not imply that a confrontational relationship exists between the
two parties, on the contrary, if both parties have opening
positions that are fair and reasonable, there should not be a
significant distance between positions, and splitting the
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TABLE 3 RANK ORDER OF ARMY NEGOTIATOR VERSUS CONTRACTOR TACTICS
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
RANK ORDER OF ARMY NEGOTIATOR VERSUS CONTRACTOR TACTICS
1.
ARMY







3. Belabor "Fair & reasonable". Negotiate with limited
authority.
4. Must be on contract by ! "Take-it-or-leave-it"
.
5. Allow face-saving exits. Play hard to get.
6. "Good-guy-bad-guy" roles. Deadlock negotiations.
7. Escalate to opponent's boss. "Off-the-record"
discussions.
8. "Low-ball" offers. Threaten to walk out.
9. Call frequent caucuses. Deliberate errors left in
offers.
10. Escalate to your boss. "My plane leaves at
o ' clock 1
"
differences might be the most efficient tactic. From the tone of
the remaining tactics of each list, one could infer that
negotiations are often confrontational and that an adversarial
relationship exists. Tactics such as "belaboring fair and
reasonable", "allowing face saving exits", and "frequent caucuses",
imply that a Army negotiators try to be patient, diplomatic,
understanding when faced with adversity. And although the other
Army tactics from the list of the top ten imply a degree of
gamesmanship is occurring, it could be argued that the tone is
neutral rather than negative. However, it is the Army negotiators'
opinion that their counterparts from industry are not as diplomatic
if early agreement is not reached. The type of tactics used by
industry, such as "deadlocking negotiations", "threatening to walk
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out", and "leaving deliberate errors in offers", suggests that
industry is the more confrontational party. The negative "flavor"
of these tactics suggest that if opening bids are not close, and
"splitting-the-difference" does not occur, than industry is
perceived by many Army negotiators as being capable of adversarial
gamesmanship and even dishonesty.
It is unfortunate that survey data from industry is not
available in order to determine their views of which tactics the
Army uses under various conditions. However, if a lack of trust in
industry exists on the part of Army negotiators, the argument can
be made that even if negotiations are collaborative (or at least
began in a collaborative manner) , Army negotiators maintain a
careful or guarded position. As discussed in Chapter II,
historically a confrontational relationship has existed. For that
reason, it is possible that the Army's method of cautious
negotiating is understandable, and possibly an indicator that a
more collaborative relationship between Government and Industry
could be established.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter examined the survey findings and analyzed those
findings in order to have a clear understanding of who constituted
the sample population. Knowing the profile of the respondents is
important not only for the value of any initial conclusions that
can be made, but also because the lack of anomalies helps validate
the survey, and therefore substantiates any conclusions that are
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made during analysis. For the purpose of this research, the
average Army contracting officer or specialist is 38 years of age,
a GS-12, has 17 years of Federal service, 15 years of contracting
experience, has a bachelors degree, has had at least one formal
advanced level contracting class, and negotiates on a frequent
basis. This chapter also analyzed the tactics used most frequently
by Army negotiators and those tactics they felt were used most
often against them by their counterparts in industry. A
statistical comparison was made of the two respective orders of
use, and no correlation or agreement could be found. A subjective
comparison of the ten most used tactics by each party revealed that
a confrontational relationship still exist. The Army negotiators
see themselves as being fair and responsible and industry as less
cooperative. Chapter VI will continue to analyze the survey
results by examining the strategies respondents preferred under
different contracting situations.
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V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The ensuing analysis of the survey findings will address the
following subsidiary research questions: 2e. Which strategies do
Army negotiators use most frequently? and 2f. What strategies are
used under different contract situations? Specifically, data from
Part II, Sections 2 and 3 of the questionnaire was analyzed to
determine the Army negotiators' strategy preferences. The ten
strategies discussed in this chapter were taken from the Catlin
study. A list of these strategies and the definitions used by the
survey respondents is shown in Table 4. [Ref. 9 :p. 100] In
addition, respondents were encouraged to add any other strategies
that they frequently used, but were not included on the
questionnaire.
B. FREQUENCY AND PREFERENCE OF NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES
Negotiation strategies are selected by negotiators for one of
two reasons: either the negotiator expects the strategy to be
successful or he/she lacks other options. If a correlation between
preferred and employed strategies can be established, then it may
be possible to compile a list of those strategies that are most
successful. Table 5 shows two sets of mean scores which each
respondent gave for the ten strategies, based on the frequency they
had used those strategies and then based on the preference in which
they would like to use them. The strategies were then rank ordered
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TABLE 4 TEN STRATEGIES AND DEFINITIONS
TEN STRATEGIES AND DEFINITIONS
1. COMBINATION (THE "BIG POT"): Introducing many issues
at one time, using "throw-away" points to get major
concessions.
2. COVERAGE ("BOTTOM-LINING"): Negotiating on total
cost/price basis versus item-by-item.
3. DEFINITE ACTION ("TESTING THE WATERS"): Taking a
definite position forcing the opposition to either accept or
reject your position.
4. LIMITS: Using authority, time, budget, or other
limits to pressure concessions from the opposition.
5. PARTICIPATION/ INVOLVEMENT: Designing the team
composition to narrow or broaden the areas of negotiation (use
of experts, for example)
.
6. PATIENCE ("BUYING TIME OR STALLING): Using delay
TACTICS to prolong consideration of an issue or to counter a
time limit STRATEGY.
7. SURPRISE: Any unexpected action to gain acceptance
of a point or obtain concessions from the opposition.
8. REVERSAL ("THE LESSER OF EVILS"): Presenting
increasingly more rigid demands forcing the opposition to
accept a lesser (preceding or following) offer - your true
objective.
9. STATISTICS ("FIGURES DON'T LIE"): Using learning
curves, trend analysis, or historical records as the primary
support for your position.
10. STEP-BY-STEP: Presenting a series of acceptable
minor points to obtain a major concession: also used to counter
"The Bottom Line" STRATEGY.
SOURCE: CATLIN AND FAENZA [REF. 9]
from most to least used or preferred. These two lists were
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examined for agreement using the Kendall Taub and Spearman rank
coefficient tests.
a. Hypothesis:
(H ) : The two rankings of the ten strategies do not conform
and are not in agreement.
(H
a ) : There is significant agreement between the two rankings
of the ten strategies.
b. Critical Value (CV) : Kendall CV = 0.648
Spearman CV = 0.648
c. Decision rule: Reject H if t > .648 or SR >.648
d. Results: T = .733 SR = .855
e. Decision: There is sufficient evidence with which to
reject (HJ .
f. Interpretation: Statistically there is a very strong
correlation between the rankings of the strategies preferred by
Army negotiators and those of the strategies used most frequently.
As stated earlier, this indicates that the strategies selected
during the pre-negotiation phase were usually used. This can be
interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation is that the
negotiator uses strategies that have been successful in the past
and that he/she believes will be effective in upcoming
negotiations. The second interpretation is that the negotiator
uses the preferred strategy simply because he or she lacks the
training or experience to use another one. The strongest argument
against the latter option is the demographic profile of the average
respondent. The survey population average respondent was 38 years
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TABLE 5 AVERAGE RANK SCORES AND RANKING OF STRATEGY
FREQUENCY OF USE AND STRATEGY PREFERENCE.








COMBINATION 4.3950 2 4.5909 3
STEP-BY-STEP 4.5573 3 5.3330 5
COVERAGE 4.5748 4 5.6608 7
PARTICIPATION 4.8699 5 4.1858 2
LIMITS 5.0241 6 5.6396 6
DEFINITE ACTION 5.2520 7 5.3091 4
PATIENCE 6.4285 8 5.9908 8
REVERSAL 6.8620 9 6.6915 9
SURPRISE 7.6293 10 7.2169 10
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
old, had 17 years of Federal service, 15 years of contracting and
had at last one advanced level contracting class. It is unlikely
that an individual with this level of experience would lack the
knowledge or experience needed to use the most effective strategy
available.
An interesting observation can be made by comparing the rank
order of strategies used most frequently from this study with those
found during the two previous Air Force studies. Table 6 shows
this comparison of strategies between the Catlin/Faenza study of
1985, the Peterson study of 1986, and the results from this study.
[Ref. 9:p. 51] [Ref. 37:p. 43] A great deal of similarity exists.
The top five strategies in each list are the same, however, they
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appear in three different orders. A general statement may be that
the top five strategies all involve negotiating from positions
based on analytical skils and team efforts, while the last five
strategies are based more on gamesmanship or negotiating tactics.
It is interesting to note that these last five strategies in all
TABLE 6 COMPARISON OF TEN STRATEGIES
1992 1985 1986
STRATEGY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
RANKING RANKING RANKING
STATISTICS 1 2 1
COMBINATION 2 4 4
STEP-BY-STEP 3 5 3
COVERAGE 4 1 2
PARTICIPATION 5 3 5
LIMITS 6 6 7
DEFINITE ACTION 7 7 6
PATIENCE 8 8 8
REVERSAL 9 9 9
SURPRISE 10 10 10
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
three studies are in almost identical order. One explanation for
the differences that exist between the three studies could be that
the profile of the average buyer in each study is slightly
different. For example, if the contracting organizations from all
three studies are involved in procuring different types of
acquisitions, then the buyers might require slightly different
strategies. Coverage was the most popular, and second most popular
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strategy in the Air Force Studies, yet it was fourth in this study.
A possible explanation is that the Army negotiators are better
trained now, than their Air Force peers were six and seven years
ago. The argument behind this statement is based on the fact that
it requires less cost estimating skills, and is easier to negotiate
contracts using coverage
,
then it is to use combination or step-by-
step because costs are not addressed element-by-element. A lack of
time might also cause negotiators to use coverage more often than
they would otherwise.
In this study, the strategy selected as the most often used
and preferred was statistics . Statistics was described to the
respondents in the questionnaire as the use of learning curves,
trend analysis, or historical records to form the basis for their
negotiating position. Of the ten strategies listed on the
questionnaire, statistics relies less on gamesmanship and
positioning and more on professional contracting skills of analysis
and preparation than the others. This is significant in that it
supports the earlier contention that respondents choose strategies
based on knowledge and experience rather than a lack of these
abilities
.
The second most used and third most preferred strategy was
combination (The Big Pot) . This involves putting a number of
issues on the table at one time and then using "throw-away" points
to obtain concessions from the other side. The third most often
used strategy was step-by-step which involves accepting minor
demands from the other side in order to receive a major concession.
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Both combination and step-by-step require analytical skills
required to evaluate proposals, and cost and pricing data which is
also the basis for statistics . However, they do require
gamesmanship by the negotiators. The use of strategies that
involve gamesmanship suggests that Army negotiators expect
negotiations with industry to be less than straightforward.
However, the presence of gamesmanship in negotiations does not mean
that there is an adversarial relationship between Army and industry
negotiators.
One of the greatest discrepancies found was with
participation , which was the 5th strategy used and the 2nd strategy
preferred. Participation refers to a tailored negotiations team
that includes experts to support the negotiator and the Army's
position. The strategy may be the 2nd most preferred because the
negotiators want assistance from experts to address areas of
unfamiliarity. It might not be used frequently, however, because
the Army lacks the human resources to support its negotiations.
Another area of disagreement was coverage. Coverage refers to
negotiating on a basis of total price or cost, rather than one
point at a time. The survey indicates that negotiators would
prefer to use coverage less often. Survey comments referenced the
lack of available time as a major reason this strategy was used
more than desired. The three least preferred strategies were
patience, reversal and surprise. Patience involves the use of
stalling tactics. A primary reason patience was not more popular,
is because Army negotiators may feel that they lack the time
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required to use this tactic. The fact that patience was so low on
the list of strategies does not mean that Army negotiators are
impatient. On the contrary, Army negotiators could demonstrate
forbearance, yet not consider thatan element of the stalling tactic
of patience. Reversal involves the use of increasingly more
stringent demands in a manner that forces the other side to accept
the first, more acceptable offer. Reversal could also mean the
hardening of a position, or displaying a "take-it-or-leave" it
attitude. The problem many Army negotiators may have had with
reversal is that it limits the room for their counterpart to
maneuver. This could stifle communication between the two parties,
which might prevent or delay an agreement. Other reasons that
reversal might be so unpopular is that negotiators may not know how
to use it, or they may feel that it is unethical and is
counterproductive to the trusting relationship that they are
attempting to maintain. Surprise was the least preferred strategy.
Some reasons that surprise is not more popular is that negotiators
might not know how to properly employ it without it taking on a
negative connotation. Also some negotiators may be using surprise
in negotiations, but do not realize it. The most likely reason
surprise was the last choice of strategies in all three studies is
because surprise as a strategy has a negative, possibly even
unethical, connotation. Respondents expressed that they negotiated
with the same group of contractors over time, and surprise could
damage the good faith, trust and rapport that they have with
industry.
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An important consideration which effects the type of strategy
a negotiator will tend to use in different circumstances depends on
his personality type. In Purchasing Negotiations , by C. Wayne
Barlow and Glen Eisen, four personality types are identified.
"Power seekers" are described as results oriented people who want
results without delay. "Power seekers" tend to focus on issues as
a whole, rather than the individual details of a project. [Ref.
2:p. 100-101] Given a choice, a "Power seeker" would probably
avoid using patience in order to gain a concession from an
opponent, because he or she would prefer a strategy that could get
results faster. He or she would also prefer to negotiate using
coverage rather than getting involved in detailed discussions over
every cost item. The second personality type according to Barlow
and Eisen, is the "Persuader". The "Persuader" is described as a
low key negotiator with a warm, generous exterior, yet who is a
very ambitious even dangerous opponent. "Persuaders" are not
detail oriented and would rather plan or handle the "big picture".
[Ref. 2:p. 106-107] If faced with an opponent with this
personality type, one could expect negotiations to progress well
unless agreement is not easily reached, and then the "Persuader"
can become very focused and tough. Barlow and Eisen' s third
personality type is the "Reliable Performer". This person is
characterized as well-rounded and capable individual who
understands the routine and is very dependable. [Ref. 2:p. 109-110]
Step-by-step would be a "Reliable Performers" preference, because
strategies such as combination and coverage would be too
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spontaneous, and surprise would probably be considered negative
gamesmanship or unethical.
C. STRATEGIES PREFERRED IN VARIOUS CONTRACT SITUATIONS
Part II, Section three of the questionnaire asked respondents
to indicate the strategy that they preferred under a variety of
contracting circumstances. If the strategies preferred under
different contracting situations differ from the order listed in
Table 5, this would indicate that there might be more efficient
strategies for different situations. If so, this information could
be useful for managers and trainers responsible for the supervision
and training of inexperienced negotiators. Although the choice of
strategies should remain with the negotiator, general "rules-of-
thumb" can be useful as guidelines during moments of indecision.
CONTRACT TYPE
The first contracting dimension in which respondents were
asked to indicate their strategy preference was by contract type.
The results of this question are shown in Table 7. Although
statistics
, combination, step-by-step, coverage , and participation
remain the more popular, there were some differences in the order
in which they were preferred. A strategy which showed a
significant difference was participation. Participation was used
less when contracting under fixed-price conditions. However, when
the purchase became more risky and required a more complex contract
type, negotiators preferred to have a tailored team of technical
experts or auditors to assist them. If a rule of thumb or standard
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TABLE 7 FREQUENCIES OF STRATEGIES UNDER DIFFERENT CONTRACT
TYPES .
FREQUENCY (AS PERCENTAGE) OF STRATEGY BY CONTRACT TYPE
STRATEGY FFP FPI CPIF CPAF CPFF
STATISTICS 29.8 28.1 18.4 19.6 22.4
COMBINATION 8.8 8.8 10.2 7.8 7.9
STEP-BY-STEP 17.5 19.3 20.4 21.6 17.1
COVERAGE 24.6 8.8 14.3 17.6 11.8
PARTICIPATION 7.9 15.8 18.4 19.6 21.1
LIMITS 4.4 7.0 4.1 7.8 6.6
DEFINITE ACTION 7.0 3.5 4.1 3.9 7.9
PATIENCE 0.0 3.5 6. 1 0.0 2.6
REVERSAL 0.0 3.5 2.0 2.0 2.6
SURPRISE 0.0 1.8 2.0 0.0 0.0
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
strategy were to be drawn from Table 7, it would focus on the
buyer's risk involved in the specific contract. If the buyer's
risk is expected to be low, that would imply that many of the costs
were definable and would imply a firm fixed-price contract. Under
firm fixed-price contracts, the "bottom-line" or "total cost" is
the main focus of the Government and coverage is preferred unless
agreement cannot be reached and another strategy would have to be
used. If buyer risk is higher, the contract type would often
reflect a sharing of risk. As a result, more attention to
individual costs and supervision of the contract would reguire a
strategy that analyzes item costs and prioritizes those costs.
Therefore a high risk contract would suggest strategies such as
statistics, combination, and step-by-step.
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DOLLAR VALUE
The next contracting circumstance in which respondents were
asked to indicate their strategy preference was by dollar value.
The results of this guestion are shown in Table 8.
TABLE 8 STRATEGY FREQUENCIES BASED ON DOLLAR VALUE.
FREQUENCY (AS PERCENTAGE) OF STRATEGY BY DOLLAR VALUE
25K TO 100K TO 1M TO 10M TO OVER
STRATEGY 100K
19.4
1M 10M 2 5M 2 5M
STATISTICS 22.8 23.7 22.8 20.3
COMBINATION 10.7 14.9 17.5 13.9 10.8
STEP-BY-STEP 8.7 19.8 23.7 19.0 17.6
COVERAGE 43.7 17.8 7.2 6.3 6.8
PARTICIPATION 1.9 7.9 18.6 22.8 31.1
LIMITS 4.9 4.0 3.1 3.8 4.1
DEFINITE ACTION 10.7 9.9 4.1 6.3 2.7
PATIENCE 0.0 2.0 1.0 2.5 5.4
REVERSAL 0.0 1.0 2.1 1.3 0.0
SURPRISE 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.4
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
As shown in Table 8 the dollar value of a contract has a
noticeable effect on the type of strategy that is used by Army
negotiators. The three most popular strategies, statistics,
combination, and step-by-step, which are based on methodical,
analytical analysis,
are used consistently throughout the range of contract values.
However, there are some strategies which showed large deviations
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based on contract value. Besides the factors of risk and contract
complexity, dollar values are used to determine different levels of
review and approval during the acquisition process. This seems to
be apparent in Table 8, especially with a strategy that is known to
be variable with risk and complexity such as coverage . Coverage is
the most used strategy, accounting for over 43% of contracts of
$25,000 to $100,000. However, the use of coverage drops
significantly for contracts valued between $100,000 and $1 million.
Definite action refers to leverage, and is defined as taking a
definite position which forces the opposition to either accept or
reject a position. Definite action seems to be correlated with
coverage in that it is very popular for negotiations valued between
$25,000 to $100,000, yet drops drastically for contracts above $1
million. One explanation for this apparent agreement between
coverage and definite action is that the Army negotiator often has
more leverage to negotiate with and can demand the contractor meet
the Government's price, if the costs on the contact are definable.
Definable means that costs can be fairly accurately estimated by
either party within a certain range. The fact that Army
negotiators tend to negotiate from a position based on statistics
and analysis, supports the argument that if costs are relatively
definable, then Army negotiators will be less likely to move from
their positions without a good argument. In addition, if all costs
are definable, then it seems logical that coverage might be used to
save time. If costs are more definable for lower dollar value
contracts, then as contract value increases and complexity
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increases, a decrease in the use of direct action and coverage
would be expected to occur.
While coverage and definite action became less popular among
Army negotiators as the contract value increased, participation
increased in popularity. In the "over $25 million" range, 31% of
the respondents listed participation as their first choice of
strategies. The primary reason for the use of participation in the
high value category is likely related to risk and the difficulty
involved in determining costs. Just as in the discussion of
contract types, Army negotiators preferred a tailored negotiations
team when contracts became more complex.
CONTRACTUAL ACTION
The next contracting circumstance asked respondents to
indicate their strategy preference based on the type of contractual
action. The results of this question are shown in Table 9.
Statistics and step-by-step continue to be consistently popular
strategies, which indicates once again, that Army negotiators tend
to negotiate from a position of statistical knowledge, rather than
counting on any advantage resulting from their position as a
monopsony or resorting to "negative" gamesmanship. However, some
other strategies show a great deal of variation in frequency of use
under different types of contract actions. "New contract" actions
reflect what one would expect since "new contracts" would include
all contract types identified for this study. As was discussed
earlier, different strategies are used with different contract
types. This explains why under "new contracts", coverage and
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TABLE 9 STRATEGY RANKINGS BASED ON CONTRACTUAL ACTION.








COMBINATION 15.5 8.8 12.6 0.0
STEP-BY-STEP 20.9 18.4 14.9 24.2
COVERAGE 11.8 20.2 17.2 3.0
PARTICIPATION 22.7 14.0 9.2 6.1
LIMITS 5.5 6.1 2.3 6.1
DEFINITE ACTION 3.6 7.0 16.1 9.1
PATIENCE 1.8 0.9 2.3 0.0
REVERSAL 0.0 3.5 3.4 9.1
SURPRISE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
participation are both used, even though in the contracting
situations discussed earlier, the frequency of each was normally
comparatively different. Another reason might be personality type.
Given a situation where more than one strategy will work, the
negotiator will use the strategy with which he or she has had the
most success, or feels most comfortable.
"Contract modifications" also showed the frequent use of both
coverage and participation. Coverage would be useful for contract
modifications of contracts where the two parties expected
relatively close opening positions, or possibly the buyer was
unsure of the cost estimates by cost element. A third possibility
might be that the buyer simply did not know the best approach to a
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particular negotiation and choose coverage because of the relative
ease in which it can be used. Participation on the other hand was
most likely used to modify complex, high value, high risk
contracts.
"Termination" contract actions are interesting because, in
addition to the statistical strategies that seem to be the basis of
all contract actions, definite action and coverage are also used.
There are several possible explanations for the Army's negotiators'
tendency to begin from a bottom-line position and force the
opposition to either accept or reject their positions. One reason
is that in most cases, costs are all capable of being estimated
with the relative certainty that both sides will arrive at the same
general estimate and therefore coverage is a more effective
strategy. Also, the negotiator is occasionally usually in a
position to use definite action if the contractor defaults and
gives the Government reason to use the termination clause.
Another interesting observation about termination actions is that
participation is not a popular strategy, even though many of the
contracts terminated are complex. Several reasons can be
suggested. In the case of terminations for convenience, contracts
may not get the attention which other types of contracts do because
the user may no longer be demanding a product. Additionally, as
discussed earlier, since most costs can be accurately estimated,
the opinion of experts is not required as much to predict or assess
allowability of costs. Another explanation for a lack of
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participation as a strategy, is that often terminations are
conducted by a specialist in terminations. A terminations
specialist has experience in estimating costs involved in contract
closures and is familiar with the financial and legal implications
of a termination. Thus he can often close without requiring the
assistance of matrix personnel.
The final category of contract actions that cosisted of
Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRA) , Final Overhead, and Advance
Agreements. In this category, the two most frequently used
strategies were statistics and step-by-step. From the popularity
of statistics and an understanding of how FPRAs work, the key
factor in this category is probably historical data, and the
analysis of those data. In a typical FPRA negotiation, cost
information for similar work from prior years is usually available
and negotiators usually negotiate item-by-item or step-by-step in
order to ensure all costs are allowable.
TYPE OF CONTRACTUAL ACQUISITION
Respondents were also asked to indicate their strategy
preference based on the type of contractual acquisition. The
results of this question are shown in Table 10. Statistics, step-
by-step, and combination remain popular. These three strategies
require negotiators to possess analytical skills. There is
statistical evidence that the level of preference of other
strategies shifts depending on the type of acquisition.
Specifically, participation is the overwhelming favorite when
negotiating research and development (R&D) type contracts. One
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TABLE 10 STRATEGY RANKINGS BASED ON TYPE OF ACQUISITION OR
PROGRAM.









STEP-BY-STEP 16.7 18.0 15.9
COMBINATION 12.1 11.2 12.2
COVERAGE 7.6 14.6 8.5
PARTICIPATION 36.4 12.4 17.1
LIMITS 3.0 1.1 3.7
DEFINITE ACTION 1.5 2.2 13.4
PATIENCE 3.0 2.2 2.4
REVERSAL 4.5 1.1 1.2
SURPRISE 0.0 0.0 0.0
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
interpretation for this is that the uncertainty and technical
complexity associated with R&D contracts demands a tailored
negotiation team. Technical experts are often required to support
negotiators during negotiations with complex data, for example,
classification of engineering labor skills or labor hours required
to complete
a certain project.
In contrast, production contracts use much less reliance on
participation and a correspondingly higher reliance on statistics
and coverage. Statistics uses learning curves, trend analyses, and
historical data as the basis for negotiations. Often in
production, contractors and administrative contracting officers use
the same information to manage a manufacturing process to ensure or
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improve efficiency. Since many of these costs are a matter of
historical record or can be predicted with relative certainty due
to industry standards, coverage or "total cost" negotiating is used
more frequently with this type of acquisition.
The respondents' strategy preference for service type
acquisitions indicate that a blend of strategies is used. This
mixture of strategy preferences probably represents the fact that
service contracts can take a variety of different forms. Those
that are new contracts or involve highly technical skills or
exacting results and would be associated with more risk or
complexity, would more likely require the talents associated with
participation. Those that are not as complex or have established
historical data on which to base negotiation positions are likely
to be the type of acquisition actions which caused the relatively
high preference for coverage. An interesting difference from other
acquisition types is greater preference for definite action over
coverage. Although the use of definite action cannot be broken out
to determine how often it is used with higher risk versus lower
risk contracts, it is most likely used on service contracts where
there is less risk and the Army negotiator is in a better position
to demand a certain price and force the contractor to accept the
Government's position.
DEGREE OF COMPETITION
The last contract situation in which the respondents were
asked to indicate their strategy preference was based on amount of
competition. The results of this question are shown in Table 11.
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TABLE 11 STRATEGY RANKINGS BASED ON DEGREE OF COMPETITION.
FREQUENCY (AS %) OF STRATEGY BASED ON COMPETITION







COMBINATION 11.2 12.1 13.8
STEP-BY-STEP 9.0 14.3 22.9
COVERAGE 28.1 19.8 10.1
PARTICIPATION 14.6 14.3 12.8
LIMITS 3.4 4.4 6.4
DEFINITE ACTION 14.6 14.3 5.5
PATIENCE 3.4 2.2 2.8
REVERSAL 1.1 1.1 0.9
SURPRISE 0.0 0.0 1.8
SOURCE: DEVELOPED BY RESEARCHER
In this situation, participation does not vary much when the degree
of competition changes. The frequencies of preferences seem to
indicate two opposing trends. There seems to be a preference for
coverage when three or more contractors are involved in
negotiations. This indicates that the Government is more confident
that total costs for the contract can be estimated (coverage) .
This conforms with the principle of the American economic system,
that a free market and competition results in a fair and reasonable
price for both the buyer and the seller. Additionally, when
competition exists, the Government is better able to establish a
"total cost" negotiating position and is in a better position to
force industry to accept the Government's position (definite
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action) . In contrast, as the degree of competition decreases, so
does the frequency with which respondents preferred coverage and
definite action. Less competition makes it more difficult for the
Government to estimate accurate contract costs and this situation
can be described as involving greater risk. As discussed earlier,
risk is often a key factor which causes Army negotiators to rely on
statistical analysis to develop their positions based on individual
cost elements. Thus negotiators use step-by-step more frequently
to work through the individual items in a contract. The
preferences of the respondents support what seems to be a trend of
more use of statistics and step-by-step as the amount of
competition decreases.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter analyzed the strategies that Army contract
negotiators preferred to use in general and specific situations.
A statistical comparison was made between the strategies that Army
negotiators use and the strategies that they would prefer to use.
A significant level of correlation was found which allowed the
conclusion to be made that in general, Army negotiators use the
strategies that they would prefer in most situations. The
strategies were ranked in order of preference and these rankings
indicate that the most preferred strategies are based on
statistical analysis of cost and pricing data, historical
information, learning curves, and trend analysis. The least
preferred strategies were consistently those strategies that seemed
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to be based on gamesmanship such as: patience, reversal, and
surprise. Although there are several reasons these three tactics
are the least popular, the most likely reason is that the
negotiator perceives these tactics as negative and perhaps even
unethical. Some respondents stated that negative strategies
threatened their trusting relationship with industry.
Analysis was also conducted of the strategies most preferred
under a variety of contract situations such as contact type,
contract dollar value, contractual action, type of acguisition, and
degree of competition. Findings indicate that in all cases,
statistical analysis was the basis from which Army negotiators
formed their positions. However, the frequency with which Army
negotiators preferred different strategies differed significantly
depending on the contract situation. Analysis of these differences
indicated that the degree of risk involved was repeatedly a key
reason for these differences. Risk resulted from the uncertainty
of cost estimation involved in highly technical contracts or
contracts that were new and lacked historical or industry data on
which to base a negotiation position. Risk also resulted from
contracts which were complex and required administrative oversight
for quality control or progress payments. The degree of
competition also reflected a difference in the amount of risk to
the Government, and a corresponding change in the type of
strategies selected and preferred was evident.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present conclusions and
recommendations which have resulted from this research. The
primary and subsidiary research questions will be answered, and
suggestions for further research will be made.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. The three tactics and strategies most preferred by Army
negotiators are: ask for lots of data, "split-the-difference". and
belabor "Fair and reasonable" ; and statistics, combination, and
step-by-step respectively. These were identified and discussed in
Chapters IV and V.
2
.
The three tactics and strategies least preferred by Army
negotiators are: "low-ball" offers, call frequent caucuses, and
escalate to your boss; and patience, reversal, and surprise
respectively. These were also identified and discussed in
Chapters IV and V. The fact that these tactics and strategies were
used very little is indicative that Army negotiators approach
negotiations in a professional and non-adversarial manner.
3 There is a logical set of strategies which is frequently
used under different contracting situations.
Analysis of the research data indicates that the preference
for the use of certain strategies varies depending on the type of
contracting situation. All contracting situations examined in this
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research showed logical shifts of strategies preferred as the
situation differed. For example, the use of coverage was greater
under firm fixed-price contacts than cost-plus-incentive-fee
contracts. Analysis indicates that certain factors are critical in
deciding which strategies are preferred under certain
circumstances. These factors are time limitations, required levels
of review and approval authority, and the amount of risk to the
Government. Examples of risk are; difficulty in estimating costs;
level of administrative action during the execution of a contract;
and complexity due to uncertainty of processes, quality, production
or delivery schedules.
4 . In general. Army negotiators use appropriate strategies
and have a professional attitude toward negotiations.
Analysis of tactics and strategies used and preferred by Army
negotiators indicates that the majority of Army negotiators are
well-educated and trained in their field. Their negotiation
positions are developed based on methodical, analytical analysis
and their approach to negotiations is one of careful optimism. The
fact that statistics, step-by-step, and combination were the three
most popular strategies supports this, while strategies which are
less cooperative, such as reversal and surprise were used by very
few respondents.
5 . An adversarial relationship between Government and industry
still exists in negotiations.
A review of the current literature on negotiation strategies
and tactics indicates that there is a movement toward a more
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cooperative relationship with industry and more participative
negotiations. However, some of the strategies and tactics analyzed
in this research indicate some preference for "gamesmanship-type"
approaches. Proponents of a closer relationship with industry feel
that the benefits are many, two of which are more efficient longer
term contracts, and lower administrative costs due to more trust
and communication. In addition, it can be argued that if the
industrial base shrinks, it will be cost prohibitive to maintain
enough contractors for some specialized industries to continue to
contract competitively. In order for the Government to fulfill its
future needs, the adversarial relationship that Government has
traditionally had with industry will have to change. At present,
negotiators from both sides approach negotiations expecting an
adversarial encounter, yet the responses to this survey suggest
that Army negotiators desire a non-adversarial relationship, and a
review of the literature suggests that industry does too. This
suggests that the relationship can become more cooperative.
6 . Army contract negotiators lack the resources desired to
conduct some of their negotiations.
Army negotiators use the strategy coverage, or total cost
negotiating, more often than they would prefer, and participation,
the use of tailored negotiating teams, less than they prefer. The
explanation for this seems to be that negotiators lack the time,
training, or subject matter experts/matrix personnel needed to help
them negotiate by cost element. As a result, Army negotiators
indicated that they use coverage in instances where they would
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rather negotiate by cost element. This may lead to less-effective
negotiations.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Training on types of strategies and tactics must continue
to be emphasized by educators and managers.
Analysis of the data collected indicate that as a rule, Army
negotiators are negotiating with the appropriate strategy based on
the contracting situation. However, a percentage of the
respondents seemed to use strategies that were not the most popular
under certain contracting situations. Research should be conducted
on tactics to determine if the seldom used tactics can be employed
effectively and whether they are being avoided due to a lack of
understanding and training. The need for additional negotiations
training is in line with recent recommendations made by the U.S.
Merit Systems Protection Board. Among nine critical procurement
skills, "conducting negotiations" was ranked the highest by both
procurement employees and their supervisors as needing additional
training. [Ref. 45:p. 12]
2
.
Solutions must be developed to help prevent the
unfulfilled demand for subject matter expertise.
The negotiators from the sample population indicated that they
used the strategy of participation much less than they would have
preferred. As a result, it was concluded that they probably
negotiated less effectively. Solutions to fill this need for
expertise must be addressed to ensure that the best strategy is
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used whenever possible. One solution might be better training for
negotiators, so that they do not need as much assistance from
experts, or possibly better organization of matrix personnel so
that the use of these limited resources is maximized. Another
solution might be a greater use of automation to reduce the
administrative work load. As a result, Army negotiators might be
able to spend more time and energy on the cognitive and
communicative tasks that are currently being rushed or skipped.
3 . Efforts must be made to improve the negotiation
relationship between Government and industry.
In order to maximize the purchasing power of the shrinking
budget, costs throughout the acguisition process must be reduced
without reducing the end product. One way this could occur is if
the negotiation relationship with industry becomes less adversarial
than it is today. It should be a goal of the entire Department of
Defense contracting community to improve trust and rapport with
industry. Hopefully the result for the Government will be better
communications, less litigation, and lower procurement costs.
D. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
What negotiation strategies and tactics are most
frequently used by Army contract negotiators and what tactics do
they perceive their industry counterparts most often use against
them?
The strategies and tactics which Army negotiators use most
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frequently are displayed in Tables 2 and 4 respectively. Analysis
of data collected during this thesis indicates that Army
negotiators use tactics and strategies which show that they
approach negotiations with their position based on statistical
analysis, and negotiate in as professional and straightforward a
manner as possible. The respondents felt that their counterparts
from industry would usually negotiate in a predictable and
reasonable fashion, however they felt that industry negotiators
were more than capable of using gamesmanship and tactics that
displayed a negative "flavor".
2 . SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What does current literature and theory say about
negotiating tactics and strategies?
A review of current literature uncovered an abundance of
information about different strategies and tactics and ways to
employ them. The general tone of all strategies and tactics can be
categorized into two basic groups. These groups are categorized as
competitive and principled. Competitive strategies are what has
historically been used by the Government in negotiating with
industry. However, there has recently been a great deal of
literature which encourages a more cooperative or participative
relationship between Government and industry. Participative
negotiations focus on needs rather than positions and are based on
mutual trust between the parties involved.
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What is the profile of the Army negotiator?
According to the data collected from the sample
population, the average Army contracting officer or specialist is
38 years of age, a GS-12, has 17 years of Federal service, 15 years
of contracting experience, has a bachelor's degree, has had at
least one formal advanced level contracting class, and negotiates
on a frequent basis.
Which tactics do Army negotiators use most frequently?
A rank ordered list of the frequencies in which Army
negotiators use 32 particular tactics is displayed in Table 2. The
three most popular tactics that Army negotiators indicated they
used the most were "Ask for lots of data", "Split-the-dif ference"
,
and "Belabor fair and reasonable". These tactics can be
subjectively interpreted to be those which indicate a
straightforward, professional approach toward negotiations. The
further down the list one looks, the more negative the tone of the
tactic becomes, however, statistically, the use of adversarial type
tactics was very small.
Which tactics do Army negotiators perceive their commercial
counterparts use most frequently?
Table 2 provides a rank ordered list of tactics which
Army negotiators feel are used most often against them. The most
popular tactic, "split-the-dif ference" implies that Army
negotiators feel that in most cases, industry expects to settle
fairly easily. However, the "flavor" of the other more popular
tactics such as "negotiate with limited authority", "take-it-or-
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leave-it offers", "play hard to get", and "deliberate errors left
in offers", indicate an adversarial relationship exists between the
parties.
Which strategies do Army negotiators use most frequently?
In general, the most frequently used strategies were
those based upon statistical analysis which utilized information
such as: cost and pricing data; historical information; learning
curves; and trend analysis. The least preferred strategies were
those strategies that seemed to be based on gamesmanship that had
a negative "flavor" such as reversal and surprise.
What strategies are used under different contract
situations?
The popularity of various strategies changed with some
predictability depending on contract situations such as: contact
type; contract dollar value: contractual action; type of
acquisition; and degree of competition. Analysis indicated that
the degree of risk involved was repeatedly a key reason for these
differences. Other factors which also effected the strategy
preferred were time limitations, required levels of review and
approval authority, and availability of subject matter
experts/matrix personnel.
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Although there is no one best strategy, certain strategies
are usually better under different situations. A project that
would be beneficial would be the construction of a decision chart
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which would lead an individual through the contract situations and
key factors which influence choice of strategies, and conclude with
one or more suggested strategies. A decision chart of this nature
would simplify the instruction of the use of strategies under
different situations as discussed in this research.
2. A follow-on study involving a similar guestionnaire, yet
focused on negotiators from industry would be interesting for
comparison value. If would be interesting to see what tactics and
strategies are used in a negotiations environment where legal
requirements for arms-length relationships do not exist.
3. An area which holds great promise for reducing the cost of
procurement is in modifying the relationship which exists between
Government and industry. A study into key factors which prevent
this relationship from becoming more cooperative could result in a
significant shift in the way in which Government approaches
procurement and could result in great economic advantages.
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APPENDIX A
The following is a list of the contracting activities and
offices that were solicited for participation in this research.
These agencies were selected from the Army Contracting
Organization And Management Data Directory, April 1992.
U.S. Army Material Command Subordinate Units
U.S. Army Military Academy, West Point
Armed Forces Radio and Television Service-Broadcast Center
U.S. Army Depot System Command
Anniston Army Depot
Letterkenny Army Depot





U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command
Watervliet Arsenal
McAlester Army Ammunition Plant
Rock Island Arsenal
U.S. Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering
Center
U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering
Center
Crane Army Ammunition Activity
U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command
Bell Apache Division
HQ, U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command
Aviation Applied Technology Directorate
U.S. Army Communications-Electronic Command
Procurement Divisions A,B,C and D.
Contract Operations Vint Hill Station
U.S. Army Laboratory Command
Installation Support Activity LAB/COM Harry Diamond
Laboratories
U.S. Army Materials Technology Laboratory
U.S. Army Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory
U.S. Army Missile Command
Procurement Divisions A,B,C, and D.
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command
Tracked Vehicle Systems Division
Policy and Management Division
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U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command
HQ, U.S. Army Operational Test & Evaluation Command
U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground
U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground
U.S. Army Jefferson Proving Ground
U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground
U.S. Army Troop Support Command
St. Louis Operations Division
Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Army Engineer Division, North Atlantic
Separate Corps of Engineer Contracting Offices
U.S. Army Topographic Engineering Center
U.S. Army Humphreys Engineering Center Support Activity
Forces Command Contracting Offices
Headquarters FORSCOM
COMMANDER, XVIII ABN Corps and Fort Bragg
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APPENDIX B
Negotiating TACTICS and STRATEGIES Questionnaire
Introduction and Instructions
This questionnaire is in two parts, Part I requests
information about your education, training, experience, current
job, organization and type of program, No information about your
name, social security number, or other identifying data is
requested; however, other "personal-type" data such as age, sex,
and rank or pay grade are requested. This data will be used for
conducting statistical analysis of the answers you provide to the
questions in Part II.
Part II contains questions requesting you to indicate how
often you use certain negotiating TACTICS and STRATEGIES in various
contracting situations.
This questionnaire is designed to be completed with minimum
time and effort. When you have completed the questionnaire, please
use the attached postage-paid envelope to return it.
Please add any information or comments you wish. I greatly
appreciate your participation. Without your time and effort, this
research project would be impossible. Thank you in advance for
your assistance.
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PART I - GENERAL INFORMATION
Please fill in the block or circle the letters indicating your
answers to the following questions:
1. Age: 20-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 55-60, 61-65
2. Sex: a. Male b. Female
3. Military rank or civilian grade:
.
4. Total number of years Federal service:
.
5. Total number of years in contracting:
.
6. Please indicate the highest level of formal education you have
attained: (Circle appropriate letter)
.
a. High School Graduate
b. College, non-degree
c. Bachelor's Degree
d. Graduate study, non-degree
e. Master's Degree
f. Masters 's Degree, plus additional hours
g. Doctorate Degree
7. Please indicate the professional continuing education (PCE)
courses in contracting that you have completed:
a. Basic contract management
b. Basic contract pricing
c. Intermediate-level contract pricing
d. Advanced contract pricing
e. Advanced Contract Administration







k. Contract Executive Seminar
1. No PCE training to date
m. Other (please list) :







9. Current position title (buyer, PCO. Division Chief, etc.):
10. Primary Contract negotiating responsibilities (negotiator, PCO,
reviewer, price/cost analyst) .
11. Type of organization you currently work in:
a. Staff (policy, review committee, etc.).
b. Single system program office.
c. Major System Command
d. Multi-system program office.
e. Research and Development (R&D) only (laboratory, etc.)
f. Mission support/field contracting (regional, load, base,
camp, post levels, etc.).
g. Other:
.
12. Estimated total number of negotiations as the lead/chief
negotiator:
.
13. Estimated total number of negotiations you participated in as
other than the lead negotiator:
.
14. Are you a Certified Professional Contracts Manager (CPCM)
(have you taken and passed the CPCM exam, and remained current)?
Other Certification (explain)
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PART II - NEGOTIATING TACTICS AND STRATEGIES
The following questions ask you to identify and rank order
various negotiating TACTICS and STRATEGIES. These TACTICS and
STRATEGIES were selected from publications by Chester L. Karras,
the National Contract Management Association's Negotiations
Procedures and Strategies Training Manual , and other sources.
While no two sources agree on all types of TACTICS or STRATEGIES,
features of the approaches from these publications were combined.
The following definitions are used in this questionnaire and are
presented here to aid you in understanding the questions.
TACTIC: ANY SPECIFIC ACTION, WORDS, OR GESTURES DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE
BOTH AN IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE (such as countering an action by the
other negotiating party) AND THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF A PARTICULAR
STRATEGY.
STRATEGY: AN ORGANIZED PLAN OF APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS FROM AN
OVERALL PERSPECTIVE WHICH MAY BE COMPRISED OF ONE OR MORE TACTICS.
Please feel free to write in and rank any TACTICS or STRATEGIES you
use most often but that are not listed. Also, please be as candid
as possible on selecting or adding any TACTIC. No positive or
negative connotations have been assigned to the TACTICS or
STRATEGIES listed, and no such connotation will be attributed to
those who complete this survey.
PART II -SECTION ONE - NEGOTIATING TACTICS
INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Line through any terms you do not recognize.
2. Rank (by appropriate letter(s)) the five TACTICS you use
most often (#1 being the most frequent)
.
3. Rank (in the same manner) the five TACTICS your
negotiating opponents use most often.
4
.




A. Adjust the thermostat
B. Allow face saving exits
C. Appeal to patriotism
D. Ask for lots of data
E. Belabor "Fair & Reasonable"
F. "Bogey" - Budget Limits
G. Call frequent caucuses
H, Change negotiators
I. "Cherry-pick" the best deals
J. Deadlock the negotiations
K. Deliberate errors left in
offers
L. Deliberately expose notes or
wrong papers
M. Embarrass your opponent
N. Escalate to opponent's boss





R. Impose "No-smoking rule"
S. "Low-Ball" offers
T. Make an offer they must
refuse
U. Massage opponent's ego
V. "Must be on contract by
i
W. "My plane leaves at
o'clock!
"




AA. Play hard to get.
























PART II SECTION TWO - STRATEGY RANKINGS
The following are definitions of STRATEGIES selected for this
survey.
1. COMBINATION (THE "BIG POT"): Introducing many issues at
one time, using "throw-away" points to get major concessions.
2. COVERAGE ("BOTTOM-LINING"): Negotiating on total
cost/price basis versus item-by-item.
3. DEFINITE ACTION ("TESTING THE WATERS"): Taking a
definite position forcing the opposition to either accept or reject
your position.
4. LIMITS: Using authority, time, budget, or other limits
to pressure concessions from the opposition.
5. PARTICIPATION/ INVOLVEMENT: Designing the team
composition to narrow or broaden the areas of negotiation (use of
experts, for example)
.
6. PATIENCE ("BUYING TIME OR STALLING) : Using delay TACTICS
to prolong consideration of an issue or to counter a time limit
STRATEGY.
7. SURPRISE: Any unexpected action to gain acceptance of a
point or obtain concessions from the opposition.
8. REVERSAL ("THE LESSER OF EVILS"): Presenting
increasingly more rigid demands forcing the opposition to accept a
lesser (preceding or following) offer - your true objective.
9. STATISTICS ("FIGURES DON'T LIE"): Using learning curves,
trend analysis, or historical records as the primary support for
your position.
10. STEP-BY-STEP: Presenting a series of acceptable minor
points to obtain a major concession: also used to counter "The
Bottom Line" STRATEGY.
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Please rank the STRATEGIES listed below according to frequency
of use and preference, by placing a number under the respective
column next to the STRATEGY. The number one (1) would indicate the
most frequently used or preferred STRATEGY, and the number ten (10)
the least frequently used or preferred. Remember if you use or
prefer a STRATEGY not listed, please describe and rank it. Your




















PART II SECTION THREE
STRATEGY RANKINGS UNDER VARIOUS CONTRACT SITUATIONS
INSTRUCTION:
1. Indicate the STRATEGY (from page 7) you most prefer to
use.
2. If you have no preference, then please so indicate by
writing "NP" on the line next to the situation.
3. If you have no experience with a particular situation,
then please so indicate by writing "NE" on the corresponding line.
4. Assume that the situation presented is the primary
determining factor in your choice.
















REMEMBER - INDICATE YOUR MOST PREFERRED STRATEGY
SITUATION STRATEGY
TYPE OF CONTRACTUAL ACTION
NEW CONTRACT
CONTRACT MODIFICATION (ECP, ADDED WORK, ETC)
TERMINATION - CLAIMS SETTLEMENT - CLOSE-OUT
FINAL OVERHEAD - FORWARD PRICING RATE AGREEEMENTS (FPRA) - ADVANCE
AGREEMENTS (e.g. IR&D)
OTHERS (Please specify)






THREE OR MORE COMPETING CONTRACTORS
TWO COMPETING CONTRACTORS
SOLE SOURCE CONTRACTOR NEGOTIATIONS
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. I really appreciate
your participation in this survey. Your responses are valuable
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